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ABSTRACT
NASA's Procedural Requirements 87052B defines the
Human-Rating Certification process and related
technical requirements for human spaceflight programs
developed by and for NASA. The document specifies
Agency-level responsibilities related to the certification,
processes to be established by the program, and
technical requirements.
1. INTRODUCTION
NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8705.2B[t]
contains NASA's current Human-Rating requirements.
The NPR defines process, procedures, and requirements
for the certification of carefully managed missions
where safety risks are evaluated acid determined to be
acceptable for human spaceflight.
The NPR assumes adherence to the high standards of
reliability and mission success required for all of
NASA's spaceflight missions, which includes
compliance with requirements contained in NASA
directives that are mandatory for any high value/high-
priority space flight program or project conducted by or
for NASA. Human-Rating certification goes above and
beyond these requirements by requiring that the space
system provides the crew with a safe and habitable
environment, a level of control over the system, and
means of escape from hazardous situations.
Certification forces a greater focus on typical safety-
enhancing measures such as failure tolerance and safety
margins. It also require features unique to crewed space
systems, such as abort triggers, logic, and systems, and
crew interfaces for the monitoring and (manual) control
of the space system.
Beyond establishing these design requirements, the
Human-Rating certification process causes the
development and operation of crewed space systems to
be subject to more scrutiny. This involves a greater role
of safety analyses in the design process, a broader scope
of such analyses, increased rigor in the validation and
verification of standard compliance, and a greater
dependence on test flights.
NPR 8705.213 establishes the current Agency-level
requirements, which are applicable to the development
and operation of crewed space systems developed by
NASA used to conduct NASA human spaceflight
missions. As was done for NASA's Constellation
Program, the requirements are expected to be tailored
and refined in Program-level documents specific to the
mission and Program's organization. The extent to
which commercial crew transportation services to the
International Space Station as defined in NASA's 2011
budget request (if approved by Congress) will be
expected to comply with requirements contained in or
derived from the NPR is currently being debated.
This paper will provide an overview of the requirements
contained in the NPR, and addresses some of the lessons
learned during application of the standard to the
Constellation Program.
2. TENETS OF HUMAN -RATING
NASA's Human Ratings Requirements document (NPR
87052B) is based on three key tenets.
The first tenet states that human-rating is the process of
designing, evaluating, and assuring that the total system
can safely conduct the required human missions. This
tenet describes the additional rigor and scrutiny
involved in the design, development, certification, and
operation of human-rated space systems. Designing a
space system, with constraints of mass and volume,
often requires compromise to reach a design that can
perform the mission, including the safe return of the
crew and passengers. In many respects, systems
engineering is about managing compromise. The risks
associated with each decision must be understood and
carefully considered. Throughout the design and
development process, the engineering, safety, and health
and medical disciplines external to the program must
constantly challenge the developers to articulate the
rationale for their design decisions. When mass and
volume constraints force a compromise, the safest
practical option must be selected. Once the system is
developed and deployed, additional rigor and scrutiny
are applied at every mission readiness review.
Development and operation teams continually look for
ways to reduce the potential for uncontrolled hazards by
exploring potential risks and uncertainties. Reducing the
uncertainties in the design and operations, exploring all
safety risks, and recognizing the potential for hazards
obscured by system complexity are all part of a human-
rating mindset.
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Tile second tenet states that human-rating includes the
incorporation of design features and capabilities that
accommodate human interaction with the system to
enhance overall safety and mission success. This tenet
accounts directly for the presence of humans in the
spacecraft or space system. In addition to providing for
the basic human needs such as environment, food, and
water, the astronauts onboard the spacecraft must be
given some level of control over the system. This tenet
thus includes all the aspects of flight crew performance
necessary for the crew to successfully carry out their
mission, without imposing undo risk to the flight crew.
Crew situational awareness, crew commanding, cockpit
display design and spacecraft environmental factors all
are critical factors that affect a crewmember's
performance and their ability to safely and successfully
operate the system. The same rigor and balance in
design trades utilized in tenet one is applied also in tenet
two to arrive at the best working environment for the
crew that maximizes the probability of mission success,
while minimizing the risk to the bight crew.
The third tenet states that human-rating includes the
incorporation of design features and capabilities to
enable safe recovery of the crew from hazardous
situations. The tenet recognizes that the human
exploration of space involves inherent risk and, despite
our best efforts, the initiation of accident scenarios
cannot always be prevented. When mitigation fails and
mission continuation is no longer possible, steps must
be taken to abort the mission and safely return the crew.
When developing spacecraft to carry humans, the design
team must incorporate capabilities and safeguards that
allow the crew to survive hazardous conditions and
safely return the crew.
The objective of the Human-Rating Certification
process is to achieve definition and implementation of
processes and technical requirements consistent with
these tenets. This requires not just that technical
standards are complied with, but that Human-Rating
considerations are integral to program activities
throughout system lifecycle. and that developers are
challenged to defend their design decisions.
3. REQUIREMENTS OVERVIEW
The requirements in NPR 8705.2 can be subdivided into
three groups:
A definition of the Human-Rating Certification
process and related responsibilities of the
Program and other entities in the NASA
organization.
Certification requirements applied to the
Program.
Technical requirements related to system
safety, system control, and crew survival/abort.
3.1. Human-Rating Certification Process
The Human-Rating process defines the major
responsibilities related to the certification of crewed
space systems as human-rated. Human-rating
certification can be obtained for the integrated space
system and for a specified mission. Certification cannot
be obtained for individual elements of the space system,
such as launch vehicles, or independent of a defined
mission.
A major role in the certification process is assigned to
the Program Manager, v--ho is responsible for
implementing the certification and technical
requirements. The Program Manager summarizes and
further documents the results of the human-rating
processes at major design reviews.
The Technical Authorities (Engineering, Safety and
Mission Assurance, Health and Medical) provide the
necessary checks and balances to assure safe and
reliable systems. The Technical Authorities, who are
independent of the programmatic authority chain, define
standards (or areas requiring program-level standards),
and disposition requests for relief from such standards.
They challenge the developers to describe the rationale
for their design decisions and help identify safety risks
and safer alternatives, Concurrence by the Technical
Authorities is required at major design reviews and
before flights,
A further role is defined for the Director of JSC, as a
representative of the flight crew. The crew's consent to
those risks must be obtained during the development of
the space system, and prior to each flight. The NPR
requires that the crew is also part of the Human-System
Integration team that is responsible for cockpit design
and human integration.
Progress of the Program towards Human-Rating
certification is reviewed by the Agency at major design
reviews. Certification is ultimately issued by the NASA
Associate Administrator, with concurrence from the
Technical Authorities, crew, and the Mission
Directorates that are part of the programmatic authority
chain. The certification is issued after ORR, but prior to
Flight Readiness Review. Compliance with the
certification, and operation within the bounds of the
certification, is verified during FRR.
While compliance with directives and standards can
provide the framework for safety, the Program Manager
is ultimately responsible for providing safe and reliable
systems that are safe enough for human missions. Roles
related to the acceptance of residual crew safety risks as
implied by the NPR are characterized in Figurel. This
model is specific to NASA's organization, and
consistent with NASA's top-level government policy
defined in NPD 1000.0. [2].
The Program Manager is responsible for the formal
acceptance of risks, e.g., additional risks that are due to
non-compliance with standards. However, the Program
Manager can only do so if the Technical Authorities
determine that those risks are within an acceptable
range. Finally, the Program Manager can only accept
such risks if the crew consents (volunteers) to take those
risks.
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Figure 1: Roles related to the acceptance of residual
risk.
3.2. Certification Requirements
The Human-Rating Certification requirements are
designed to lead the Program Manager through the
certification process and define the contents of the
HRCP.
Early in the certification process, the Program Manager
roust define the scope of the human-rating activity. This
includes a definition of the space system to be human-
rated and the mission that the system is to be human-
rated for. Human-rating certification is formally applied
to the crewed space system, consisting of all the system
elements that are occupied by the crew/passengers
during the space mission and provide life support
functions for the crew/passengers (i.e., the crewed
elements). The crewed space system also includes all
elements physically attached to the crewed element
during the mission such as launch vehicles. The crewed
space system is part of the larger space system used to
conduct the mission. The certification process and
requirements may affect functions and elements of other
mission systems, such as control centers, launch pads,
and communication systems.
The certification requirements define required elements
of the process for the development and operation of
space system implemented by the program manager.
This includes the establishment of a Safety and Mission
Assurance program, safety analysis processes, the
definition of crew survival strategies, and the
establishment of processes for the evaluation of human
workload and the impact of potential human errors. The
human-system integration (hardware and software) for
the crewed space system must be lead by a Human-
System Integration Team Manager consisting of human-
system integration team, consisting of astronauts,
mission operations personnel, training personnel,
ground processing personnel, human factors personnel,
and human engineering experts.
Separate certification requirements require that the
outcome of these processes, and the impact that these
processes had on the design, be summarized for the
major design reviews. For example, one such
requirement states that the program must present how
the safety analysis activities related to loss of crew were
used to understand the relative risks and uncertainties
within the design and subsequently influence decisions
related to the system design and application of testing.
The intent is for the program to show that safety
analyses are iteratively used to make design decisions to
eliminate hazards, control initiating events or enabling
conditions related to hazards, and/or mitigate the
resulting effects related to the hazard. The intent is thus
not to track all decisions and provide a linkage to the
assessment that influenced those decisions, rather, the
intent is to summarize how the analyses were used.
Specific elements of these requirements will be
discussed in later sections,
3.3. Technical Requirements
Chapter 3 of the NPR contains the technical
requirements. The requirements in this chapter consist
of design requirements that are specific to systems used
for human spaceflight systems consistent with the tenets
of Human-Rating. These requirements apply in addition
to the requirements contained in technical standards
mandated by NASA's Technical Authorities, and four
standards called out in the NPR 8705.213, namely
• NASA-Standard-3000 Volume I -11, Man-
Systems Integration Standards.
• NASA-Standard-3001 Volume 1, Space Flight
Human Systems: Crew Health.
• FAA HFDS - Human Factors Design Standard.
• MIL-STD-1472, Department of Defense
Design Criteria Standard - Human Engineering
As the titles suggest, these focus on human-systems
integration and crew health.
The technical requirements contained in the NPR
identify capabilities in three areas, namely system
safety, human control of the system, and crew survival
and aborts. The requirements are not intended to be all
inclusive or an absolute prescription for human-rating,
and compliance with these requirements is not
considered to assure a safe system for human missions
into space. The technical requirements are intended to
provide the foundation of capabilities upon which the
Program Manager will build by identifying and
incorporating additional unique capabilities for each
reference mission, based on an understanding of origins
and assumptions behind requirements, as well as history
lessons, legacy solutions, expert opinions, and best
practices. Specific requirements are listed in Appendix
A of this paper. The NPR provides rationale and
interpretations for many of the requirements.
Beyond the ability to sustain a safe, habitable
environment for the crew, the system safety
requirements address failure tolerance, tolerance to
inadvertent operator actions and hazardous behavior of
critical software, the ability to detect, annunciate, isolate
and or recover from faults, ability to utilize health and
status data during and after a mission, the ability to
perform critical functions autonomously without
communication with Barth, and the ability of the crew to
access equipment in case of emergencies.
The system control requirements state that the crewed
space system must provide the capability for both the
crew and mission control (remotely) to monitor,
operate, and control the crewed space system and
subsystems, where this capability is necessary to
execute the mission, prevent a catastrophic event, or
prevent an abort. Here, the crew should be able to
manually override higher-level software control and
automation (such as automated abort initiation,
configuration change, and mode change) when the
transition to manual control of the system will not cause
a catastrophic event.
The crew must have the ability to manually control the
flight path and attitude of their spacecraft throughout the
mission. with the exception of the atmospheric portion
of Earth ascent when structural and thermal margins
have been determined to negate the benefits of manual
control.
The ability to monitor, operate, and control must also be
provided for unmanned vehicles possible during
proximity operations where an unmanned vehicle is
within the safety zone of a crewed vehicle.
4. FAILURE TOLERANCE REQUIREMENTS
Compared to earlier revisions of NPR 8705.2, revision
B modified its approach to the definition of system
safety requirements. As the NASA Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel (ASAP) observed [3], rather than
relying primarily on redundancy via fixed failure
tolerance requirements. NPR. 8705.25 seeks a risk-
informed design approach in which decisions regarding
failure tolerance and other safety-enhancing features
are made based on an understanding of the level of
safety, and the significance of individual safety risk
contributors.
This approach is reflected by requirement 3.2.2 (see
Appendix A), which states that the specific level of
failure tolerance and implementation is to be derived
from an integrated design and safety analysis, with a
minimum of one failure tolerant. The requirement is
supplemented by requirement 3.2.3 which states that
emergency equipment such as fire suppression systems,
fire extinguishers and emergency breathing masks,
launch/entry pressure suits, and systems used
exclusively for launch aborts, may not be counted as
part of the system's failure tolerance. The failure
tolerance requirement thus pertains to systems and
equipment that prevent the initiation of a catastrophic
event, rather than mitigate consequences once an
initiating event occurs.
As defined in the NPR, safety analysis as intended by
NPR 8705.2 combines existing techniques such as
Hazard Analyses, Fault Tree Analyses, Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis, Damage Modes and Effects
Analysis, Critical Items Lists as well as probabilistic
risk analyses such as Probabilistic Risk Assessment
(PRA) [4], and simulation modeling techniques (e.g.,
physics-based abort analyses such as those performed
for the Axes I vehicle [51).
The term `integrated safety and design analysis' then
refers to the active and iterative application of such
techniques, and the use of the collective results from
these analyses to assess and prioritize safety risks of
proposed design solutions. Such assessments and
prioritizations then serve to inform decisions regarding
required levels of failure tolerance and other safety
enhancing measures such as margins and abort triggers.
This is in contrast to using individual (stove-piped)
techniques as assurance tools to verify compliance with
deterministic safety criteria such as fixed failure
tolerance requirements.
The formulation of this system safety requirement is not
without criticism. One critique is that the failure
tolerance requirement can be interpreted as a single
failure tolerance requirement, and that the burden of
proof should be reversed to use the integrated analyses
to argue the reduction from a nominal level of failure
tolerance (e.g., two). Such reductions could then be
made based on findings that they would not lead to
significant increases of safety risk. No determination
has been made whether the requirement should be
changed.
A second critique, voiced by ASAP [3), is that the
approach can only be viable if a common understanding
of "sufficiently safe" exists to guide design decisions. In
the case of the Constellation Program, guidance exists
in the form of Loss Of Crew (LOC) probability
requirements established by the Program. ASAP argued
however that acceptable risk levels, including associated
confidence levels, must be defined at the Agency level
to ensure consistency across programs, including
commercial efforts. In response, NASA is preparing a
change to its policy to make the adoption of Agency-
level safety goals and associated thresholds part of the
Human-Rating certification process.
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APPENDIX A: TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
Following are the technical requirements contained in
Chapter 3 of NPR 8705.2B. The full document,
available at http://avodis3.L^ sfc.nasa.aov/main lib.htrnl
contains rationale for many of these requirements.
3.2.1 The space system shall provide the capability to
sustain a safe, habitable environment for the crew
3.2.2 The space system shall provide failure tolerance to
catastrophic events (minimum of one failure tolerant),
with the specific level of failure tolerance (one, two or
more) and implementation (similar or dissimilar
redundancy) derived from an integrated design and
safety analysis (per the requirement in paragraph
2.3.7.1) (Requirement). Failure of primary structure,
structural failure of pressure vessel walls, and failure of
pressurized lines are excepted from the failure tolerance
requirement provided the potentially catastrophic
failures are controlled through a defined process in
which approved standards and margins are implemented
that account for the absence of failure tolerance. Other
potentially catastrophic hazards that cannot be
controlled using failure tolerance are excepted from the
failure tolerance requirements with concurrence from
the Technical Authorities provided the hazards are
controlled through a defined process in which approved
standards and margins are implemented that account for
the absence of failure tolerance.
3.2.3 The space system shall provide the failure
tolerance capability in 3.2.2 without the use of
emergency equipment and systems.
32.4 The space system shall be designed to tolerate
inadvertent operator action (minimum of one
inadvertent action), as identified by the human error
analysis (paragraph 2.3.11), without causing a
catastrophic event.
3.2.5 The space system shall tolerate inadvertent
operator action, as described in 3.2.4, in the presence of
any single system failure.
3.2.6 The space system shall provide the capability to
mitigate the hazardous behavior of critical software
where the hazardous behavior would result in a
catastrophic event.
3.2.7 The space system shall provide the capability to
detect and annunciate faults that affect critical systems,
subsystems, and/or crew health.
3.2.8 The space system shall provide the capability to
isolate and/or recover from faults identified during
system development that would result in a catastrophic
event.
3.2.9 The space system shall provide the capability to
utilize health and status data (including system
performance data) of critical systems and subsystems to
facilitate anomaly resolution during and after the
mission.
3.2. 10 The crewed space system shall provide the
capability for autonomous operation of system and
subsystem functions which, if Iost, would result in a
catastrophic event.
3.2.11 The space system shall provide the capability for
the crew to readily access equipment involved in the
response to emergency situations and the capability to
gain access to equipment needed for follow-up/recovery
operations.
3.3.1 The crewed space system shall provide the
capability for the crew to monitor, operate, and control
the crewed space system and subsystems, where: a. The
capability is necessary to execute the mission, or b. The
capability would prevent a catastrophic event; or c. The
capability would prevent an abort.
33.2 The crewed space system shall provide the
capability for the crew to manually override higher level
software controllautomation (such as automated abort
initiation, configuration change, and mode change)
when the transition to manual control of the system will
not cause a catastrophic event.
3.33 The space system shall provide the capability for
humans to remotely monitor, operate, and control the
crewed system elements and subsystems, where:
a. The remote capability is necessary to execute the
mission; or b. The remote capability would prevent a
catastrophic event; or c. The remote capability would
prevent an abort.
3.4.1 The crewed space system shall provide the
capability for the crew to manually control the flight
path and attitude of their spacecraft, with the following
exception: during the atmospheric portion of Earth
ascent when structural and thermal margins have been
determined to negate the benefits of manual control.
3.4.2 The crewed spacecraft shall exhibit Level 1
handling qualities (Handling Qualities Rating (HQR) 1,
2 and 3), as defined by the Cooper-Harper Rating Scale,
during manual control of the spacecraft's flight path and
attitude.
3.5.1 The space system shall provide the capability for
the crew to monitor, operate, and control an uncrewed
spacecraft during proximity operations, where: a. The
capability is necessary to execute the mission; or b. The
capability would prevent a catastrophic event; or c. The
capability would prevent an abort.
3.5.2 The crewed space system shall provide the
capability for direct voice communication between
crewed spacecraft (2 or more) during proximity
operations.
3.6.1.1 The space system shall provide the capability for
unassisted crew emergency egress to a safe haven
during Earth prelaunch activities.
3.6.1.2 The space system shall provide abort capability
from the launch pad until Earth-orbit insertion to protect
for the following ascent failure scenarios (minimum
list): a. Complete loss of ascent thrust/propulsion. b.
Loss of attitude or flight path control.
3.6.1.3 The crewed space system shall monitor the Earth
ascent launch vehicle performance and automatically
initiate an abort when an impending catastrophic failure
is detected.
3.6.1.4.1 The space system shall provide the capability
for the crew to initiate the Earth ascent abort sequence.
16.1.4.2 The space system shall provide the capability
for the ground control to initiate the Earth ascent abort
sequence.
3.6.1.5 If a range safety destruct system is incorporated
into the design, the space system shall automatically
initiate the Earth ascent abort sequence when range
safety destruct"commands are received onboard, with an
adequate time delay prior to destruction of the launch
vehicle to allow a successful abort.
3.62.1 The crewed space system shall provide the
capability to autonomously abort the mission from Earth
orbit by targeting and performing a deorbit to a safe
landing on Earth.
3.63.1 The crewed space system shall provide the
capability to autonomously abort the mission during
lunar transit and from lunar orbit by executing a safe
return to Earth.
3.6.4.1 The crewed space system shall provide the
capability to autonomously abort the lunar descent and
execute all operations required for a safe return to Earth.
3.6.5.1 The space system shall provide the capability for
the crew on the lunar surface to monitor the descent and
landing trajectory of an uncrewed spacecraft and send
commands necessary to prevent a catastrophic event.
3.6.7.1 The crewed space system shall provide the
capability for unassisted crew emergency egress after
Earth landing.
3.6.7.2 The crewed space system shall provide a safe
haven capability for the crew inside the spacecraft after
Earth landing until the arrival of the landing recovery
team or rescue forces.
3,6.7.3 The space system shall provide recovery forces
with the location of the spacecraft after return to Earth.
